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Abstract
We use hedonic prices and purchase quantities to consider what can be learned
about household willingness to pay for baskets of organic products and how this varies
across households. We use rich scanner data on food purchases by a large number of
households to compute household speci￿c lower and upper bounds on willingness to
pay for various baskets of organic products. These bounds provide information about
willingness to pay for organic without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences.
We show that the reasons households are willing to pay vary, with quality being the
most important, health concerns coming second, and environmental concerns lagging
far behind. We also show how these methods can be used for example by stores to
provide robust upper bounds on the revenue implication of introducing a new line of
organic products.
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How much are households willing to pay for organic products? How does this vary across
households? Does it re￿ ect a desire to improve the environment, achieve better health or
eat better quality food? Answer to these questions are important for a number of reasons
including to inform regulation, licensing and labelling of organic foods, to increase govern-
ment knowledge about household valuations of agricultural and environmental policies, and
to understand the potential pro￿tability of new products. The widespread availability of
rich microdata sources that provide precise measurements of household level prices, quanti-
ties and utility relevant characteristics for individual products (de￿ned at the barcode level)
make it feasible to explore these questions in greater detail than was previously possible. In
particular, they allow for the study of hedonic prices and hedonic demand across the entire
basket of household food purchases at the household level.
These data also present research challenges due their size and dimensionality. One way
to proceed is to focus on a small number of goods. A second is to aggregate goods, or to use
economic theory to impose structure that makes the problem tractable. We take another
approach, inspire by the revealed preference literature (e.g. Varian (1982), Blow, Browning
and Crawford (2008)) and from the recent growing interest in partially identi￿ed models
(e.g. Manski (2003), Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), and Pakes (2003)), to study
what can be learned with minimal revealed preference assumptions and relying more on the
quality of the data.
We ￿nd that hedonic prices estimated using scanner data allow us to compute house-
hold speci￿c lower and upper bounds on willingness to pay for various baskets of organic
products. They do not allow us to point identify structural demand parameters, but do
provide informative bounds on willingness to pay for organic products taking the current
equilibrium as a starting point. They do this without imposing overly restrictive assump-
tions on preferences, which are needed in order to point identify and estimate a structural
demand system. Our estimates rely only on the assumptions that: households know the
1distribution of prices in the market and willingly choose to purchase organic or not, house-
hold utility depends on observable characteristics (and possibly unobserved characteristics),
the set of marketed products is rich enough to allow us to unbundle product characteristics.
More precise estimates of willingness to pay require further assumptions about household
preferences.
Our contribution in this paper is threefold. First, we explore how much can be learned
empirically if we rely only on the assumptions of hedonic revealed preference and use de-
tailed household level data on purchases, prices and characteristics. This type of data is now
becoming widely available across many countries. We observe actual prices and quantities of
individual items at the bar code level, along with characteristics of all food items purchased
and brought into the household. Compared to other empirical papers in the literature our
data are not aggregated in any way, and we observe the prices actually paid, including all
discounts and special o⁄ers. Second, we use information on purchases of all types of or-
ganic foods from a nationally representative panel of households across the UK to estimate
households￿revealed preference for organic foods. In contrast to much of the hedonic liter-
ature, we compute willingness to pay not for a discrete item, but for baskets of products.
We compute quantity weighted hedonic price premia (expenditure premia) and use these to
bound households￿willingness to pay. This is the ￿rst comprehensive look at product pricing
and household purchase behaviour using detailed disaggregate data on the entire basket of
food purchases, which account for on average 13% of total consumer expenditure.1 Third,
we combine information on revealed preferences with responses to attitudinal questions on
households￿preferences and beliefs to disentangle households￿bounds on willingness to pay
for organic into bounds on willingness to pay for the environment, health and quality.
Precise measurements of prices, quantities and characteristics allow us to accurately
analyse the relationship between prices and characteristics and to explain most of the vari-
1Work using similar data has looked either at the aggregate basket of groceries (e.g. Smith, 2004) or at
single product categories, for example, breakfast cereals (Nevo, 2001), ketchup (Pesendorfer, 2002), yoghurt
(Ackerberg, 2001) or carbonated soft drinks (Dube, 2005).
2ation in prices. They also allow use to estimate heterogeneous bounds on willingness to
pay for individual households. Willingness to pay, or at least bounds on willingness to pay,
vary across products and across households. A large fraction of households never buy any
organic products and have a willingness to pay bounded above by observed price premia.
The fraction that buys organic varies signi￿cantly across product categories ranging from
0% to 13%. Of those buying organic products, a signi￿cant fraction are willing to pay quite
a large amount. These variations across products and across households in bounds on will-
ingness to pay are obscured by higher levels of aggregation. Additionally, we show how to
aggregate estimates of the willingness to pay coe¢ cients for di⁄erent products in a manner
that is consistent with consumer theory to produce bounds on willingness to pay for baskets
of goods. These bounds are Laspeyres style price indexes for di⁄erentiated products.
We ￿nd that aggregate willingness to pay for organic foods in 2004 in England was at
least £114m per annum, and that the most that households would have been willing to pay
for a fully organic food market was £10.9bn. The latter number is an extreme counterfactual,
and we also consider other "feasible" organic baskets. These yield lower estimates on the
upper bound of £6.6bn and £5bn.
We use our results to undertake a number of counterfactual simulations. We consider
the potential revenue implications for a supermarket chain of converting a product range
to organic. We also show that households vary in the reasons they are willing to pay for
organic products, with product quality and health being the most important factor, and
environmental concerns lagging far behind. We estimate that the total lower bound on
willingness to pay for health is around £17m, for the environment around £5m, and for
quality around £20m. These results have implications for the regulation of organic labelling,
and for the way that ￿rms may want to advertise organic products.
In the household demand literature, our work is most directly related to Blow, Browning
and Crawford (2007), who develop non-parametric revealed preference methods to estimate
willingness to pay and apply it to organic milk sales in Denmark. In contrast to their work
3we: look at the entire basket of food products for which organic is a relevant characteristic;
analyse the data at a more disaggregated level (both in terms of time and product) by using
actual transaction level unit prices rather than monthly average unit prices. In order to
obtain more precise results they impose several theoretical restrictions, speci￿cally, a known
separability structure on preferences and no time varying preference shocks. In contrast, we
impose fewer restrictions and rely more on the highly detailed disaggregate data.
In the hedonic literature2, our work is most closely related to work on hedonic prices
in retail settings such as Pakes (2003), Bajari and Benkard (2005a, 2005b), and Erickson
and Pakes (2007). Bajari and Benkard (2005a, 2005b) study hedonic prices and willingness
to pay for computers. They discuss nonparametric estimation of hedonic price functions
and use a factor structure to model unobserved characteristics and recover prices of these
characteristics. Bajari and Benkard (2005b) note that a hedonic price index can ignore
pricing of unobserved characteristics if the relationship between observed and unobserved
is stable. In our setting, the stable relationship assumption justi￿es our decision to ignore
unobserved characteristics. Bajari and Benkard also discuss potential selection corrections
for cases where selection may matter, as do Pakes (2003) and Erickson and Pakes (2007).
In our setting, where technical change is slow, there is little product entry and exit, and
where highly detailed information on characteristics and prices is available, we argue that
these issues are not of ￿rst order importance. Unmeasured characteristics contribute little
to the variation of prices in our data and, because of the stability of the market, it is quite
plausible that the relationship of any unmeasured characteristics to measured is stable.
Our work is also related to the price index literature. The most closely related papers are
Hausman (2003), Pakes (2003), and Triplett (2004). Triplett (2004) presents a comprehensive
discussion of uses of hedonic methods in constructing price indexes. E⁄ectively, what we have
done is compute household speci￿c hedonic price indexes and analyse the implications of these
2Our work is most closely related to work on hedonic prices in retail market settings. However, it is also
related to work on hedonic prices in labor economics (Sattinger (1995) and Leeth and Ruser (2003)), in
environmental economics (Freeman (1995), Smith and Huang (1995), Chay and Greenstone (2005), Sieg et
al. (2005)) and urban and public economics (Epple and Sieg (1999), and Sieg et al. (2005)).
4for consumer valuation of organic foods. Hausman (2003) discusses biases in the consumer
price index (CPI). He notes that biases in the CPI are mainly due to substitution bias, new
goods bias and store bias. He notes that statistical authorities often use hedonic regressions
but is skeptical of the value of these regressions since there is no simple relationship between
price and consumer valuation. Since price is determined by the interaction of demand, cost
and competitive conditions, a hedonic price is not a compensating variation. While this is
correct, we show that the hedonic price is a lower bound to compensating variation in general
models as discussed in Scotchmer (1985), Pollak (1989) and Pakes (2003).
It has long been understood that analogues of classic revealed preference arguments
apply to hedonic prices (see for example Scotchmer (1985), Kanemoto (1988), Pollak (1989),
and Pakes (2003)). These papers show that while hedonic prices do not identify structural
supply or demand parameters, they can be used to bound willingness to pay and willingness
to accept (at least given the existing equilibrium). Pakes (2003) develops the argument when
a consumer makes a discrete choice. We build on Scotchmer (1985) and Pollak (1989) to
develop the argument when consumer choice involves choice of a discrete option along with
a continuous intensity of use for a basket of goods. Essentially, the fact that a household
paid a premium to purchase a basket of goods implies that the household must have been
willing to pay at least as much as the premium.3
A key issue in hedonic models is interpretation of the error term. This has been empha-
sised at least since Griliches (1961) and is discussed in detail in Epple (1987), Pakes (2003),
Triplett (2004), Bajari and Benkard (2005a, 2005b) and Erickson and Pakes (2007). De-
spite the fact that our hedonic price regressions explain the large majority of price variation
for nearly all products, it still may be important to account for the impact of unobserved
product characteristics on price and on willingness to pay. We discuss this further in section
3.
3The bound is not structural except under very restrictive assumptions. It may change when market
prices change. To estimate structural demand parameters or supply parameters one must use techniques
such as those in Epple and Sieg (1999), Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Smith (2004), Bajari and
Benkard (2005), or Heckman, Matzkin and Nesheim (2008).
5The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes a model of
household behaviour. Section three discusses the market environment. Section four describes
the data and our empirical implementation. Section ￿ve presents estimates of the lower and
upper bounds on households￿willingness to pay for organic. Section six considers the extent
to which this willingness to pay re￿ ects concerns about the environment, health or quality.
A ￿nal section summarises and makes some concluding remarks.
2 Household demand
The model underlying our analysis is a simple rational choice model of a price taking house-
hold maximising utility. Each household chooses a shopping basket given the set of stores
in the market and the prices of all products. The household￿ s choices then reveal bounds on
their willingness to pay. In particular, the willingness to pay for organic is the willingness
to pay for all of the organic characteristics in the basket. We make this more precise below.
First, to develop intuition, we describe the model in the case of a discrete choice of a single
product. We then extend the analysis to model the choice of a basket of products, some
fraction of which are organic.
2.1 Demand for a single product
First, we recall a simple single product discrete choice model. A household maximises utility
by choosing one product from a ￿nite number of options each described by a vector of
characteristics and a price. For some product, let z 2 Z ￿ Rn be the vector of all product
characteristics observed by the households and let z (j) be the j0th coordinate of z: The set
Z is the set of feasible characteristics for the product. The product characteristics include
the organic characteristic, package size, brand, store identity and location, ￿ avour, variety
and others (see Table 3 for details). Let z (1) = 1 if a product is organic and let z (1) = 0
otherwise. The product price is given by p = h(z), where h(z) is the equilibrium hedonic
price de￿ned for all z 2 Z including those not sold in equilibrium. We discuss the market
6environment and determination of prices in section 3.
The vector z is the vector of product characteristics observed by the household. These
are the characteristics that a⁄ect the household￿ s choice. In the empirical section of the
paper, we change the notation slightly to account for measured characteristics z (that are
measured in the economic analyst￿ s data) and unmeasured characteristics ": In this section,
to simplify the notation, we use the single letter z to indicate the full vector of measured
and unmeasured characteristics.
Consider a household (indexed h) with characteristics xh that buys a single unit of an
organic product o with product characteristics zo and price po and elects not to buy a non-
organic product n with characteristics zn and price pn: The vector xh includes household
income, measured demographic characteristics and survey responses, and unmeasured het-
erogeneity and preference shocks such as the presence of household visitors, weather, travel
cost shocks, random variation in who within the household does the shopping, etc. Note
that xh may also include unobserved shocks such as those arising in a logit discrete choice
model.
Assume that o and n are identical in all dimensions other than organic. Let the house-
hold￿ s indirect utility function be denoted v (xh;z;p), where v is increasing in z (1); di⁄eren-
tiable in p and @v




o) ￿ v (xh;z
n;p
n): (1)
The household obtains higher utility from the organic product. By the mean value theorem,













@p > 0 is the marginal utility of income. After rearranging, we have







7The left side of this expression is the willingness to pay for organic for a single organic item.
This expression is completely general. All else, including expenditures on all other goods and
period speci￿c preference shocks, is held ￿xed in (2): In case the products are not identical,
inequality (1) would be replaced by v (xh;zo;po) ￿ v (xh;e zn;pn)+(v (xh;zn;pn) ￿ v (xh;e zn;pn))
where e zn (1) = 0 and e zn (j) = zo (j) for j ￿ 1 and inequality (2) would also include this
additional term. The right side is the organic price premium. Revealed preference implies
that the price premium is no bigger than willingness to pay. If the household bought the
organic product, then they must have been willing to pay a premium of at least po ￿pn: For
all households that buy organic, the price premium de￿nes a lower bound on their willingness
to pay for organic. The complementary statement is also true. For all households that do
not buy organic, the price premium provides an upper bound on their willingness to pay for
organic.
2.2 Demand for a basket
When a household buys a basket of goods, which includes some organic and some non-
organic products, the reasoning is similar. The willingness to pay for an organic basket will
be de￿ned in terms of the characteristics of all the goods in the basket and the total cost of
the basket. Some baskets are more organic than others; they have a larger fraction of items
that are organic. We de￿ne a non-organic basket to be one in which no products are organic.
A fully organic basket is one in which all products are organic.
We ￿rst de￿ne some notation that is necessary both to de￿ne the notion of willingness
to pay for a basket and for the empirical implementation in the next section. Households
shop in a ￿nite set of stores S and choose how much to spend on a ￿nite set of products
B: The set of products is partitioned into G categories, with each category labeled by an




product b 2 Bg sold in store s 2 S has a vector of characteristics zbs 2 Zg ￿ Rng that a⁄ect
utility. The set Zg is the set of feasible characteristics for product category g: As in the
8single product example above, we assume that zbs (1) = 1 if and only if (b;s) is organic. We
de￿ne z = fzbsg(b;s)2B￿S to be the vector of all characteristics of all products.
The price of each product (b;s) 2 B ￿ S is pbs and the vector of all prices is p =
fpbsg(b;s)2B￿S. For each category g; the price of product (b;s) is given by pbs = hg (zbs) where
hg is the hedonic price function for category g: For each g; the function hg is de￿ned for all
z 2 Zg including those not sold in equilibrium.
Given market prices p and product characteristics z; each household chooses a vector of
quantities of each product, qh = fqhbsg(b;s)2B￿S, to maximise utility. That is,
v (xh;z;p) = max
qh
fu(xh;z;q) subject to p ￿ q = xh (1)g
where xh (1) is income and v (xh;z;p) is the indirect utility obtained by household h: Let the
attained utility level be v: In general, the basket purchased will include both organic and
non-organic products and the fraction organic will vary across households.
For each household, we observe the actual basket purchased and the price and character-
istics of all items purchased. How do we de￿ne willingness to pay for organic? In the discrete
choice case, willingness to pay is de￿ned with respect to an alternative that is identical in
every dimension except organic. When the household purchases a basket however, there are
multiple dimensions of organic, one for each product in the basket. We calculate the lower
bound on willingness to pay by comparing the household￿ s actual expenditure to what would
have been spent if all the products purchased were transformed into non-organic products.
That is, how much would the household have spent if they had purchased the same bundle
qh but with counterfactual vectors of characteristics and prices (zn;pn) where we use the n
superscript to denote ￿non-organic￿ .
Formally, let zn = fzn
bsg(b;s)2B￿S be a counterfactual vector of characteristics with zn
bs (1) =
0 and zn
bs (j) = z0
bs (j) for j > 1 and for all (b;s) 2 B ￿ S: The vector zn is the vector of
characteristics in the counterfactual world in which all organic products are transformed
into non-organic products. If the hedonic price schedule is unchanged in this counterfactual
world, then for all (b;s) 2 B ￿ S and for all g; prices are given by pn
bs = hg (zn
bs) where
9hg : Zg ! R is the hedonic price function for product category g. In hedonic equilibrium,
the price function prices all bundles, even those that are not marketed. Below we check
in our data that the support of the marketed products is rich enough so that households
can e⁄ectively unbundle product characteristics, as discussed in Heckman and Scheinkman
(1987). We also discuss how to compute a counterfactual bundle by replacing each product
with its nearest non-organic neighbour in the product space when the household can not
unbundle.
We can also write the dual of the household maximisation problem. Given prices p;




fp ￿ q subject to u(xh;z;q) = vg:
The value eh is the cost minimising expenditure when characteristics are z and prices are p:
The optimal consumer basket in this case is qh:
Consider the thought experiment of transforming all products to non-organic, maintain-
ing the current price schedule, keeping everything else constant, and calculating household






where the vector pn = fpn
bsg(b;s)2B￿S is the vector of prices under the counterfactual assump-
tion that every organic product price premium is set to zero. In this counterfactual thought










is the total organic expenditure premium the household would be willing to pay for the bundle
qh: That is, it is the willingness to pay for the organic characteristics in the bundle qh: Its
negative is the compensating variation; the amount that exactly compensates a household
for a change from (p;z) to (pn;zn):
10If the utility function were known or qn
h were known, we could calculate this willingness





h = eh ￿ e
n
h ￿ (p ￿ p
n) ￿ qh:
By choosing to purchase qh; the household has revealed that it is willing to pay at least
(p ￿ pn) ￿ qh to purchase organic. This follows immediately from cost minimisation since
p
n ￿ qh ￿ e
n
h:
That is, with counterfactual prices pn; the cost of the original bundle is at least as large as
the new cost minimising basket.
The expenditure premium is household speci￿c. It depends on the bundle purchased. It
is the quantity weighted sum of the individual item price premia. The price premium for an
individual item or a speci￿c basket is the same for all households. The expenditure premia
we calculate are household speci￿c because we use household speci￿c baskets.
In a similar way, we can use our estimates to calculate bounds on willingness to pay for
alternative counterfactual baskets. For example, we consider what would be the lower bound
on a household￿ s willingness to pay if a store converted a range of its products to organic
(and the household continued to purchase the same basket.) This counterfactual would be
of interest to a ￿rm considering its product strategy or to competition authorities studying
hypothetical market outcomes.
We can also compute an upper bound for willingness-to-pay for a completely organic
bundle. For example, we consider the somewhat extreme counterfactual bundle in which all
products are organic. Let zo = fzo
bsg(b;s)2B￿S be the ￿all-organic" counterfactual character-
istics vector with zo
bs (1) = 1 and zo
bs (j) = zbs (j) for j > 1 and for all (b;s) 2 B ￿ S and let
po
bs = hg (zo
bs) for all (b;s) 2 B ￿ S and for all g: We compute upper bounds on willingness




o ￿ p) ￿ qh:
11This characteristics bundle is the maximally organic bundle; all products are transformed
into organic products. No households actually purchase this bundle. We can also compute
various "feasible" organic bundles, which consists of those products for which an equivalent
to a non-organic product is available (i.e. all characteristics match except the organic one.).
In summary, for each household we can calculate lower and upper bounds on willingness
to pay for organic using
w
n
h = (p ￿ p






o ￿ p) ￿ qh ￿ e
o
h ￿ eh: (4)
For each household that purchases any organic items, equation (3) provides a lower bound
on willingness to pay for the bundle of organic items actually purchased. For all households,
equation (4) provides an upper bound for willingness to pay for organic for all non-organic
items purchased. These lower and upper bounds are not strictly comparable; they are not
bounds on the same goods. The former is a lower bound for willingness to pay for organic
for the fraction of the basket that is organic. The latter is an upper bound for willingness
to pay for the fraction of the basket that is non-organic.
This fact reveals a basic limitation of the data and of our minimal set of assumptions.
Without more information or more structure, it is not possible to estimate an upper bound
for the organic fraction of the basket. Nor is it possible to estimate a lower bound for the
non-organic fraction of the basket. To estimate these missing bounds, we would need to
add minimal assumptions on preference shocks and store switching behaviour and use the
panel aspect of the data and cross-store price variation to identify willingness to pay.4 What
we do in this paper is consider what we can learn without this additional structure. We
use a minimal set of assumptions and see how well results accord with prior beliefs about
reasonable values for willingness-to-pay. As one can see in the tables at the end of the paper
4In ongoing work, we are estimating a discrete-continuous demand model that imposes further structure on
utility, exploits the panel nature of the dataset and exploits household level price variation across transactions
induced by random shocks to the store choice process. Exploiting the repeated observations in the panel
data is more complicated than in a simple discrete choice framework, for example, because the dimension of
the vector qht is very large.
12and in section 4, an enormous amount of information about willingness to pay is revealed
from this simple but thorough analysis of this sort of high quality disaggregate data that is
now commonly available.
2.3 Assumptions
As we emphasised in the introduction, our objective is to consider what can be learned about
willingness to pay while making minimal assumptions. What have we had to assume to get
this far? And how does that compare with other methods in the literature?
The approach described above to identify a lower and upper bound on willingness to pay
requires the following:
1. Utility depends on observable characteristics measured in our data, and possibly on
unobserved characteristics that are mean independent of the observed characteristics.
2. Households maximise utility, have complete knowledge of the market environment and
incur no search frictions.
3. The set of marketed products is rich enough to allow households to e⁄ectively bundle
product characteristics.
All of these assumptions are common throughout the hedonic literature and the di⁄er-
entiated product demand literature. Much of this literature imposes additional restrictions
on household preferences. Blow, Browning, and Crawford (2006) assume that preferences
for milk are separable, that milk characteristics enter household utility through a known
linear technology, and that there are no time varying preference shocks. The discrete choice
demand literature in retail settings (see for example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995),
Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Smith (2004)) assumes that preferences have an index struc-
ture, mostly ignores quantity choices (excluding Smith (2004)), and usually assumes that
households have vectors of preference shocks a⁄ecting utility for di⁄erent options in their
choice sets. These shocks are usually assumed to be i.i.d. across time. We view the set of
13assumptions in this paper as the minimal set of assumptions that is consistent with previous
literature.
Some of our assumptions could be relaxed (at least to some extent) but at a cost. If the
mean independence assumption is invalid, one could in principle add product ￿xed e⁄ects
or impose a factor structure on the error terms in the hedonic regressions. Adding search
frictions to the analysis would add an element of complexity to the interpretation of the
results. First of all, search frictions could explain why households switch between organic
and non-organic products. Di⁄erent draws from the price and product distribution would
correspond to unobserved characteristics in the hedonic price equation and perhaps to time
varying unobserved preference shocks. A model that addressed these issues would have to
allow for correlation between these unobservables and both product and household observ-
ables. Finally, the product unbundling assumption could be relaxed by comparing actual
purchases to substitute purchases that exist in the market and by re-de￿ning counterfactual
assumptions. We discuss this last point further in section 4.3 below.
2.4 Household heterogeneity
In addition to computing lower bounds on willingness to pay for each household, we can
analyse how these lower bounds vary with demographic characteristics and survey responses
to attitudinal questions that capture some aspects of the main shopper￿ s preferences and
beliefs. Our estimated lower bounds are
w
n
h = (p ￿ p
n) ￿ q (xh;￿h)
where we have written q (xh;￿h) to emphasise that household demand depends on observ-
able household characteristics xh and unobservable household characteristics ￿h: In our data,
observable household characteristics include total expenditure, household structure, social
class, age, region, and observable measures of preference and belief heterogeneity such as
survey responses to questions about attitudes towards organic products, toward the envi-
ronment and toward health and product quality. We discuss these data in more detail in
14section 4.
Without imposing more structure and using the panel nature of the data, we cannot
estimate the demand functions q. In particular, we expect that quantities demanded will
depend on prices and that prices will depend on unobserved heterogeneity. However, we can
estimate a reduced form willingness to pay regression of the form
lnw
n
h = d(xh) + ￿h;
where xh is a vector of household characteristics as described above and ￿h is a scalar
error term with E (￿h jxh) = 0. These regressions allow us to study how important each
observable household characteristic is in explaining variation in household level lower bounds
on willingness to pay for organic products.
3 Market environment
The set of products marketed and the price premia for individual items are determined in
the market equilibrium of the groceries market. This is a market in which a small number of
￿rms sell a large number of di⁄erentiated products to a large number of households. Thus,
the set of products and the price premia are determined in an oligopoly marketing and pricing
game. The observed market outcomes re￿ ect the technological feasibility of producing and
selling various products, the costs of di⁄erent ￿rms and di⁄erent stores, the number and
types of ￿rms in the market, and the distribution of demand across locations and products.
In other words, the expected market equilibrium prices depend on costs, variation in
elasticities of demand, and competitive conditions in the local grocery market. For example,
if the marginal production cost di⁄erences between organic and non-organic beef are larger
than those between organic and non-organic chicken then, everything else equal, we expect
the organic price premium to be higher for beef than for chicken. On the other hand, it might
be the case that organic beef demand is more price elastic than organic chicken demand, or
that entry into organic beef production is less elastic to pro￿ts. Each of these factors plays
a role in determining the hedonic price of meat in the grocery sector.
15In this environment, for each food category g, we estimate a hedonic price function of
the form
p = hg (z;")
where we assume that hg is the true hedonic price function for food category g, z is a
vector of measured characteristics, " is an unmeasured characteristic with E ("jz) = 0 and
hg : Rng ! R. In theory, we could estimate each hg non-parametrically. However, despite
the very large sample sizes we have, the large dimensionality of z makes this impractical.
Note, however, that all elements of z are discrete. Instead, for each product category we
estimate a log-linear model of the form
ln(pbst) = ￿t + ￿zbs + "bst
where ￿t is a time dummy, and where "bst includes an indicator of whether the product is
on sale and a common regional component of prices.5 For any particular food category, the














One limitation of the data is that pbst is only recorded if item b is purchased in store s at
time t: Otherwise, it is not observed. Let dbst = 1 indicate that we observe at least one
occurrence of the price. We assume that
E ("bst js;dbst = 1) = E ("bst js;dbst = 0) = 0:
That is, we assume that the distribution of the unobserved characteristics is no di⁄erent
amongst the items that are not purchased. This is a weak assumption for several reasons.
First, the weighted TNS sample is nationally representative of both all consumers and all
expenditure items. By construction, the sample is meant to have the desired property.
Second, the sample size is extremely large and very high frequency. If an item is ever
purchased, the probability it appears in the sample is high. The sample includes every item
5The achieved R2 are all very close to one. In ongoing work, we are estimating more ￿ exible speci￿cations.
16purchased on a daily basis by a representative sample of 17,162 individuals over a the period
of a year. Third, items that are never or rarely purchased are items for which a very small
fraction of the market has willingness to pay larger than the price. On average these items
could have high prices, low willingness to pay or both. In our application, there is no reason
to expect that pricing amongst these items is systematically di⁄erent from pricing amongst
sampled items. Erickson and Pakes (2007) ￿nd that a similar assumption does not hold in
monthly data for the television market. However, in contrast to their study, our data sample
has a much higher frequency (daily), focuses on a very di⁄erent market (groceries), and is
a much larger sample of individual transactions. In the empirical section, we discuss the
extent of potential bias arising from violation of this assumption.
For each food category g 2 G; the estimated hedonic price function b hg is an estimate
of the market opportunity set facing households. For existing products, each provides a
consistent estimate of the market equilibrium price. For products that do not exist but that
are technologically feasible however, it provides at most a close approximation to equilibrium
prices. For products that do not exist, equilibrium prices are bounded below by the constraint
that no households wants to buy them and bounded above by the constraint that no ￿rms
want to sell them. For these goods, it may not be appropriate to extrapolate from prices of
existing goods. Instead, it may be more appropriate to substitute an existing good that is
nearby in characteristics space. We investigate this issue empirically in section 4.3.
It has long been recognised that interpretation of the error terms in hedonic regressions
plays an important role in hedonic analysis (see Griliches (1961), Epple (1989), Pakes (2003),
Triplett (2004), Bajari and Benkard (2005), and Erickson and Pakes (2007).). In the liter-
ature, three main sources for this error term have been considered (see Triplett (2004) for
a detailed discussion.). First, it could be measurement error. In this case, if the measure-
ment error is mean independent of the observed characteristics, then the estimated hedonic
price function is consistent and the counterfactual hedonic prices can be predicted using the
hedonic price function and ignoring the error term. Second, it could re￿ ect unmeasured
17product characteristics that are observed by buyers and sellers and hence that a⁄ect market
prices. In this case, if the unmeasured product characteristics are mean independent of the
observed characteristics we can still estimate the hedonic price function consistently but we
must use care in predicting counterfactual prices. Counterfactual prices rely an assumption
about what value of unmeasured characteristics is assumed for the counterfactual goods.
Transforming a good from organic to non-organic holding everything else constant requires
holding the unobservable constant as well. Alternative counterfactuals can be generated
under di⁄erent assumptions about the level of unobserved characteristics that is forecast for
the counterfactual good. Finally, the error term in the regression could re￿ ect pricing errors.
In this case, the analysis is similar to that in the unobserved characteristics case. Alternative
counterfactuals can be generated under di⁄erent assumptions about the level of the ￿pricing
error￿for the counterfactual product. In our analysis, we include the error term because
we believe that in our data measurement error is relatively minimal, while the other two
considerations may be more important.
4 Data and empirical results
The data come from the TNS Homescan panel and cover the period 8 November 2003
to 7 November 2004. Households record purchases of all items that are brought into the
home using hand-held scanners. Prices are recorded from till receipts collected from the
households. We use information on prices, quantities and characteristics of all food items
purchased for home consumption by 17,162 households. The sample contains data on more
than sixteen million purchases. The characteristics data includes information on a large
number of product characteristics judged to be important by market researchers as well as
store identity and location. We discuss these in more detail in section 4.2. Demographic
information and information on a range of consumer attitudes (including attitudes towards
health, quality, the environment and organic) is updated annually by a telephone survey.
Further details on how the data are collected are given in the Data Appendix.
184.1 Organic market shares
We consider all food products that are purchased by households in the UK and brought
into the home. Individual food products (de￿ned by a unique bar code) are grouped into
categories such as ￿fresh lamb￿ , ￿tea￿ , ￿olives￿ .6 In total there are 146 such groups. We
restrict our analysis to those food categories where more than one food product is available
as organic and where we observe more than ten purchases of these goods over the year - this
includes 98 food products.
Total expenditure on all 146 food categories in our sample of households is £22.5m,
while spending on the food categories we focus on is £21m. The 98 food categories we
consider are shown in Table 1, along with total expenditure, the share on organic, the
number of purchases, and the share of purchases that are organic. The ￿rst column of
Table 1 shows annual expenditure grossed up to the national level using household sampling
weights. The bold rows summarises these data under 19 broad categories. On average 1.4%
of expenditure is on products that have the organic characteristic. This ranges from ￿sh,
which is infrequently organic, to fruit and vegetables, for which 2.7% of expenditure is on
organic products. There is a large amount of additional interesting information in Table 1
which we leave the reader to consider own their own.
Table 4 breaks these market shares down to the household level. Around 18% of house-
holds never buy any organic products, and over one-third buy only a very small amount (less
than one-quarter of one percent of their total expenditure). However, 26% of households
spend more than 1% of their budget on organic products, and there are a small number of
households (1.67%) that spend over 10% of their budget on organic products. These numbers
illustrate the tremendous heterogeneity in demand for organic products, and that organic is
an important expenditure category for a signi￿cant part of the population.
6We use the categories used by the market researchers.
194.2 Organic price premia
Our interest in this paper is to estimate bounds on household willingness to pay for organic
and to investigate how these bounds vary with demographic and attitudinal variables. To
accomplish the ￿rst task we compare the price of organic products with the price of non-
organic products in the same category, conditioning on a large range of other characteristics.
This price di⁄erence provides a bound on willingness to pay for the discrete choice described
in section 2.1. As an example, Table 2 displays results for the bacon rashers food category.
The ￿rst column displays results from a univariate regression showing that on average or-
ganic bacon rashers are 85% more expensive than non-organic. If the organic characteristic
cannot be unbundled from all other characteristics, then this measure provides a bound on
willingness to pay for organic (and all other characteristics bundled together with organic).
Note that the adjusted R2 in this regression is 0.01. The organic characteristic explains
only 1% of the variation in the log price of bacon rashers. The average organic/non-organic
price di⁄erence is measured precisely with a standard error of 0.114. In this regression each
observation is a transaction (an occasion when a household bought a product from a shop).
There are 152,158 such transactions in our data for purchases of bacon rashers. The standard
errors are clustered at the barcode level as prices of a speci￿c product may be correlated
across stores and time periods.
The single variable regression is very poor at predicting the price of bacon rashers because
it omits many other characteristics that are important determinants of the price. Moreover,
as we show in section 4.3.1, it appears that non-organic alternatives to organic bacon, iden-
tical in every dimension save organic, are available for nearly all bacon products. In such
circumstances, a multivariate regression of bacon prices on characterstics is required to pro-
vide a bound on willingness to pay for organic. The second column of Table 2 reports results
controlling for a large number of other important characteristics of bacon rashers - the pack-
age size, whether the product is branded, own brand or private label, whether the bacon is
back or streaky, where it originates from, whether it is packaged or loose, whether it was
20purchased on sale, what type of store it was purchased in, which month it was bought it, and
where in the country it was purchased. Controlling for these other characteristics reduces
the coe¢ cient on organic to 0.48 and increases the adjusted R2 to 0.98. After accounting
for other characteristics, organic bacon rashers are 48% more expensive than non-organic.
The multivariate hedonic regression explains 98% of the variation in bacon rasher prices.
As a group, the characteristics included are extremely good predictors of the price of bacon
rashers. Using the estimated markup from column (2) of Table 2, equation (3) and data
on quantities we can calculate the lower bound on the willingness to pay for organic bacon
rashers.
We repeat this analysis for each of the 98 food categories in the data by running 98
separate regressions of the log of the unit price on a large number of characteristics of the
products. Each regression includes a set of characteristics that is common to all categories
(organic, branded, fascia e⁄ects, package size, time and region e⁄ects) as well as a set of cat-
egory speci￿c characteristics. The characteristics included as regressors in each regression
are summarised in Table 3. There is interesting variation in the number and type of charac-
teristics that di⁄erentiate products in di⁄erent food categories, for example, lamb appears
fairly homogenous, with four origins, two package types and two varieties, whereas yoghurt
(with 259 ￿ avours) and soups (with 325 ￿ avours) arevery di⁄erentiated. Note that all of
these regressors are discrete valued variables. The organic coe¢ cients and their standard
error along with the adjusted R2￿ s from each regression are also shown in Table 3. Each row
in the table shows results from a separate regression.
The ￿rst notable feature of Table 3 is that the adjusted R2 are very high. Across the
98 food groups the adjusted R2 is above 90% in 71 cases and above 80% in all but 8. The
observed characteristics in this dataset do a very good job of explaining the price variation
in these markets.
Another notable feature of the results is that the estimated organic price premium is al-
most always positive and varies signi￿cantly across product categories. Of the 98 coe¢ cients,
2172 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. The mean of the price premia is 0.33
and the median is 0.28. The coe¢ cients range from -0.09 (four coe¢ cients are negative, but
none of these is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero) to 1.44.
How much di⁄erence does it make to control for other observable characteristics? If
we had simply looked at the mean di⁄erences in price between organic and non-organic
goods we would substantially over-estimate the mean premium at 0.56 and the median at
0.54. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the estimated coe¢ cients across product categories
when we control only for organic (the lower density further to the right) and controlling for
all product characteristics (the higher density further to the left). As can be seen in the
￿gure, controlling for all characteristics shifts the distribution to the left and reduces the
cross-category variation.
Despite the reduction in variance due to including more controls there still is signi￿cant
cross category variation in the price premium for organic products. An open question is how
much of this variation is explained by variations in costs of production and how much by
variation in market structure and pricing and variations in willingness to pay. On the cost
side, we expect organic price variation due to variation in costs of organic production across
categories. On the demand side, we might expect variation in the organic price premium
due to variations in the relationship between organic and things that households actually
value such as quality, health and the environment. For example, it might be that organic is
a stronger indicator of quality for products with high price premia than for products with
low price premia. As a result, demand for these products might be less price elastic resulting
in higher price premia.
As discussed in section 2.3, the organic price premia are bounds on willingness to pay for
individual organic items under the assumption that the organic characteristic can be bundled
(and unbundled) from other characteristics. Under the same assumption, these item speci￿c
bounds can be combined with data on quantities purchased to estimate household speci￿c
bounds on willingness to pay for baskets of organic products and to investigate how these
22vary across households. We study these bounds and their variation in sections 4.4 and 4.6.1.
First, however we investigate empirically whether the bundling assumption is reasonable.
4.3 Bundling
Our analysis assumes that for every organic product, a non-organic alternative identical in
every dimension other than organic can be purchased on the market, and that it is techno-
logically feasible to convert every non-organic product into an organic product with all other
characteristics held constant. These assumptions allow us to construct predictions of prices
for goods that are not observed and to bound willingness to pay. We consider two empirical
questions:
1. Does the data support the assumption that for every organic product, we can ￿nd a
non-organic product identical in every other (measured) dimension?
2. Is it technologically feasible to produce organic versions of all existing non-organic
products? In particular, for every non-organic product, can we ￿nd an organic product
identical in every (measured) dimension other than organic?
4.3.1 Non-organic alternatives to existing organic products
To look at the ￿rst question we consider all organic product in our data and calculate the
minimum distance in characteristics space to each non-organic product, ignoring di⁄erences
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Table 7 details the results. In the ￿rst two columns we include fascia in the set of char-
acteristics, while in the second two columns we also exclude fascia from the characteristics
set. There are 3383 organic products in our data, a number of which are sold across several
fascia, giving us 7323 product-fascia combinations. From the table we can see that 81%
of the organic products in the sample have at least one identical non-organic alternative
that is sold within the same fascia. Most of the other organic products have a non-organic
alternative that di⁄ers in only one dimension, with around 0.6% having a closest alternative
that di⁄er in two dimensions (with one di⁄ering on three dimensions). When we consider all
products in the market we see that 87% of organic products have a non-organic alternative
that is the same on all characteristics, and only 14 products di⁄er in more than one char-
acteristic. Clearly, the data support the assumption that the organic characteristic can be
unbundled from other characteristics for almost all products. The largest number of organic
products for which there is not a perfect non-organic substitute are fruit and vegetables,
where for example organic varieties of a speci￿c type of fruit might come from one country
while non-organic varieties come from a di⁄erent location, so the products will di⁄er in the
origin characteristic.7
4.3.2 Feasibility of converting non-organic products to organic
In a similar spirit, we consider whether the products in our sample provides evidence about
the availability of organic alternatives to existing non-organic products. For every pair
(i;j) 2 Bo
g ￿ Bn





1(zi (k) 6= zj (k))
7In cases were no non-organic option is available, we can estimate an alternative price expenditure premia
by comparing each organic item to a non-organic item that is closest in characteristics space and price. This
method is similar in spirit to the replacement methods that statistical authorities use when sampling prices
for price indexes when they cannot ￿nd a product whose price has previously been sampled.
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g is the set of characteristics excluding organic, time, and size, and were we again
consider the products sold within the same fascia and in the entire market. We consider the
latter to tell us about the technological feasibility of producing organic alternatives, while
the former also re￿ ects the choice of the store over whether to carry that range.
The results are shown in Table 8. There are 87,370 non-organic products in our sample,
a number of which are sold across multiple fascia, giving us 213,885 product-fascia combina-
tions. For 41% of these products we observe at least one organic product sold in the market
that is the same in all other characteristics, whereas only 29% of these are sold within the
same fascia. There are a large number of non-organic products where there is no exact or-
ganic equivalent, but in most cases there are products that are close, i.e. that di⁄er only by
a few characteristics. The single product that di⁄ers on 7 characteristics is an own-label soft
cheese that is sold in KwikSave, a store that sells relatively few organic products. In the case
where we look across the whole market, the two products that di⁄er on six characteristics
are both tinned fruits - one is pineapple chunks and the other mandarin orange slices.
4.4 Bounds on willingness to pay
We now turn to our estimate of the lower bounds on individual households￿willingness to pay
for organic foods, as given by equation (3). Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 2 show the distribution
of this variable. Table 5 shows the distribution of the lower bound measured in 2004 pounds
sterling. Just under 20% of households either bought no organic products, or bought only a
small amount whose price premium was below zero, revealing that their willingness pay for
organic may very well have been zero or negative. The remaining 80% of households were
willing to pay at least some positive amount for organic goods. Around 30% were willing to
pay less than a pound a year, while over 50% were willing to pay more than £1 a year, around
8% were willing to pay more than £10 and 98 households were willing to pay more than £100
a year. As fractions of annual expenditure, these numbers are quite small. That is because
expenditure on organic goods represents only 1.4% of all expenditure, and the expenditure
25premium on organic is by construction only a fraction of the organic share. To see how
important the expenditure premium is relative to the expenditure share, Table 6 expresses
these numbers as a share of households￿annual expenditure on organic foods. From these
numbers, we can see that the expenditure premia represent relatively large fractions of total
organic expenditure; 73% of households have a willingness to pay that is more than 10% of
the organic food expenditure. Figure 2 shows the density of the distribution of the lower
bound on willingness to pay (excluding the zeros and the top percentile). Most households
are willing to spend very little on organic foods, but a small fraction are willing to spend a
relatively large amount.
We also compute estimates of upper bounds on household￿ s willingness to pay for organic
based on equation (4). Figure 3 show the distribution of this. These upper bounds are very
large and represent an extreme case - what is the most that a household would be willing to
pay to convert all the goods purchased to organic.
4.5 Aggregate willingness to pay
What do these individual bounds on willingness to pay suggest about the aggregate will-
ingness to pay? We report all ￿gures grossed up to UK population levels using household
demographic weights, based on the Annual Census. The aggregate lower bound is £121
million. The total expenditure that we observe in our sample is £37 billion, of which £535
million is on organic products. The lower bound thus represents 22% of annual expenditure
on organic products. If all organic products were removed from the market, the loss to the
economy would be at least £121 million. This number assumes that the organic character-
istic can be unbundled for all organic products. If we focus only on organic products that
have an identical non-organic alternative already in the market (total expenditure on organic
products in this group is £478 million) we ￿nd that the aggregate estimated lower bound is
£109 million. The error introduced by ignoring bundling issues in this case is not very large,
about 10% of the total.
26Our estimate of the aggregate upper bound in our sample, again grossed up, is £11,757
million or roughly 32% of grocery expenditure on non-organic products. This is an upper
bound on the gain to the economy that would arise by requiring all products to switch
to organic production. This number is extreme. However, it represents an upper bound
for a very extreme counterfactual - changing the economy from one in which 1.4% of food
expenditure is on organic products to one in which 100% is organic.
We consider two more restrictive counterfactuals for an upper bound based on "feasible"
organic baskets. The ￿rst one is where we consider the counterfactual of converting only those
non-organic products where an organic alternative is already available in the market (from
any supplier). Total grossed up expenditure on these products was £17,727 million, and the
estimated upper bound on willingness to pay for organic in this group was £5,174 million or
29% of all grocery expenditure. Our second feasible basket is to consider only non-organic
products that are also currently available in the organic form in the same supermarket fascia
(i.e. from the same supplier) that the household purchased the non-organic product from.
Total grossed up expenditure on these products is £11,820 million, and the estimated upper
bound on willingness to pay for organic on these products is £3,207 million or 27% of total
expenditure.
It is worth emhasising that, in general, our lower bound and our upper bound are not
strictly comparable, because they are literally bounds on willingness to pay for organic apples
and oranges. However, there are some special cases where they are comparable. Suppose
indirect utility is separable and takes the form
v (xh;g1 (z1;p1);:::;gB (zB;pB)):
where (pbs;zbs) is the price and characteristics vector for good (b;s): Then, for each good,
the tradeo⁄ between characteristics and price is independent of all other goods. Moreover,
if the functions gbs for all (b;s) are identical, then the tradeo⁄ is the same for all (b;s).
Under these two conditions, household xh will have a unique willingness to pay for organic
- a willingness to pay that is the same for all goods. For all goods this consumer buys, the
27consumer will buy organic if the price premium is less than the willingness to pay. Under
these conditions, every organic purchase decision is independent and identical; there is a
single threshold. Unfortunately, these assumptions are immediately rejected by the data.
There is not a single threshold that explains organic purchase decisions. Nevertheless, if one
assumed that the separability plus unique willingness to pay assumptions were approximately
true, the we could argue that range from 22% to 32% represents an estimate of the lower
and upper bounds on willingness to pay for organic.
4.6 Analysis
In this section we analyse two examples of how these bounds can be informative. We ￿rst
consider how the lower bound in willingness to pay varies with household characteristics,
beliefs and attitudes. Secondly, we evaluate the implications of our bounds for potential
revenue that a store could earn from introducing a new organic product line.
4.6.1 Variation in willingness to pay
Why are households willing to pay for organic food? We combine our estimates with demo-
graphic information and survey response data on attitudes towards health, the environment
and product quality as described in section 2.4 to shed light on this question. We consider
the variation in our estimated lower bound on willingness to pay for organic foods for house-
holds that report di⁄erent preferences and beliefs, controlling for a number of demographic
characteristics. We exploit qualitative survey data that are collected by TNS and consider
three main factors that have been highlighted in the literature as being reasons why people
value organic, and on which we have data - bene￿ts to the environment, health bene￿ts, and
better quality food.
In the survey households are asked to indicate the degree to which they agree with each
of the following statements:
1. Organic products are healthier
282. I try to buy a healthy range of foods these days
3. Organic foods are friendlier to the environment
4. I try to buy environmentally friendly products
5. Organic foods are better quality
6. I don￿ t mind paying for quality
For each statement, respondents are asked to choose one response from the list
fAgree strongly, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagreeg:
We treat these responses as qualitative measures of household preferences and beliefs and
investigate the statistical relationships between the responses and the lower bounds to house-
hold willingness to pay. For each of the three factors (environment, health, quality), we have
one response that provides a qualitative measure of beliefs and a second that provides a
qualitative measure of preferences.
We ￿rst report cross-tabulations of responses to these survey questions, household organic
expenditure shares and the lower bound on their willingness to pay for organic. In order to
reduce the dimensionality of our tables, we report results that pool the ￿ve possible survey
responses into two groups, (Agree strongly, Agree) and (Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree,
Strongly disagree). Tables 9-11 show these cross-tabulations.
Table 9 shows that 2196 households say both that they try to buy healthy foods and
that they think organic products are healthier. For these households organic products make
up 3.4% of total expenditure, and these household have a mean lower bound on their will-
ingness to pay that represents 0.8% of their total food expenditure. Agreement with both
statements is correlated with high expenditure shares. In contrast, 7503 households do not
particularly try to buy healthy foods and do not think organic foods are healthier. Disagree-
ment with both statements is negatively correlated with organic expenditure shares; organic
29products make up 0.9% of total expenditure in this group and their estimated lower bound
on willingness to pay for organic is 0.3% of total expenditure on food. Tables 10 and 11
display similar ￿gures for the questions related to the environment and quality. A total of
1957 households both feel that organic products are good for the environment and try to
buy environmentally friendly products. These households spend 2.7% of their budget on
organic foods and are willing to pay at least 0.6% of total expenditure. A smaller number
of households, 1345, believe organic products are higher quality and do not mind paying for
quality; these households spend a larger share (4.3%) on organic products and have a higher
estimated lower bound on willingness to pay of 1% of total food expenditure.
We use these survey responses to try and disentangle what motivates households to
purchase organic foods by looking at how the lower bounds on the willingness to pay vary
with households￿responses to these questions. We regress the households￿lower bounds
on willingness to pay on the attitudinal responses discussed above and a range of other
household characteristics including: family structure, total annual expenditure on food and
non-food items (as a proxy for income), the household￿ s social class, where A (upper middle
class - higher managerial, administrative or professional), B (middle class - intermediate
managerial, administrative or professional) C1 (lower middle class - supervisory or clerical,
junior managerial, administrative or professional) or C2 (skilled working class - skilled manual
workers) (the omitted category is D (working class - semi and unskilled manual workers) and
E (those at lowest level of subsistence - state pensioners or widows (no other earner), casual
or lowest grade workers)), and whether anyone in the household is a vegetarian. The means
of these variables are shown in Table 13 (most are discrete variables).
In Table 12 we investigate how the lower bound on willingness to pay varies with house-
hold preferences and attitudes. In column (1) we include dummies that are equal to one if
the household is in the upper left-hand quadrant of Tables 9, 10 or 11 respectively, as well as
an indicator of whether the household￿ s responses to these questions were missing. House-
holds that care a lot about organic and health have on average a lower bound on willingness
30to pay that is £6.00 higher than households that do not (i.e. are in any of the other three
quadrants of Table 9). Households that care a lot about organic and the environment have a
lower bound that is £1.61 higher and those that care about quality have a lower bound that is
£9.83 higher. Responses to each of the attitude questions are positively correlated with both
organic market shares and lower bounds on willingness to pay for organic. Moreover, the
average lower bound is highest amongst the group for whom quality is important, next high-
est amongst the ￿health is important" group, and next highest amongst the "environment
is important" group.
In column (2) of Table 11, we also include indicators of households that are in the
upper right and lower left quadrants, with little e⁄ect. In column (3) we include the other
demographic controls, again with little e⁄ect. In columns (4)-(6) we repeat this speci￿cation
for each of the main social classes separately, and see broadly similar patterns. The estimates
in Table 12 allow us to calculate the contribution to willingness to pay lower bounds of each of
the three concerns - health, environment and quality. In all cases we see that valuing quality
is the characteristic that is associated with households that have the highest lower bound
on their willingness to pay, followed by health with environment contributing the least. If
we want to know the aggregate lower bound on the valuation of these three concerns then
we need to consider not only the mean lower bound on the valuation for those who have
the preferences and attitudes that the particular issue is important, but also the number
of households that fall into that group. Combining those two pieces of information we get
estimates that suggest that the total lower bound on willingness to pay for health is around
£17m, for the environment around £5m, and for quality around £20m. These results are
interesting and may be surprising to some people. Quality and health seem to be much
more important factors in determining the amount (or at least the lower bound) households
are willing to pay for organic products. This has implications for the regulation of organic
labelling, and for the way that ￿rms may want to advertise organic products.
314.6.2 Introduction of a new organic product line
The upper bound on willingness to pay can also be informative. Suppose a ￿rm were con-
sidering whether to convert some set of products to organic. What would be the potential
impact? If we are willing to make speci￿c assumptions about preferences, the form of utility
and costs then we can obtain precise estimates about the impact on pro￿ts. But what if we
are concerned about the validity of these assumptions? Our results allow us to estimate an
upper bound on the potential revenue implications of such a move without imposing strong
assumptions. This bound is the ￿rm speci￿c component of our previously computed upper
bounds. To illustrate, we compute upper bounds on revenue gains from converting two spe-
ci￿c food categories to organic - eggs and fruit. In a similar way, we could calculate results
for any other food categories.
In considering such a strategy, basically three factors drive di⁄erences in projected revenue
across stores - the baseline expenditure on the category in each store, the current proportion
that is organic, and the price premium on organic. We can easily calculate the ￿rst two from
our data (and they are ￿gures that a store would readily know). To get the third we need
to have the hedonic regresions. We re-estimate the hedonic regressions allowing the organic
price premium to vary across the major stores. We include a separate organic price premium
for Asda, Safeway, Sainsbury, Tesco, Marks & Spencer, Waitrose, the large discounters (Aldi,
KwikSave, Lidl, Netto and Iceland), other chains and Small stores.
We ￿nd signi￿cant variation in the price premia charged by di⁄erent stores. For eggs, the
premia range from 29% to over 49%. Similarly, the organic share of the eggs category varies
substantially from less than 1% to over 20% . There is also a large variance in the total
expenditure on eggs. Putting these together, for each store we estimate an upper bound
on the revenue increase from converting all eggs to organic. These estimates range from an
increase in revenue of around 30% for Large Discounters to a maximum increase of just over
60% for Sainsbury￿ s and Waitrose.
Looking at fruit we see an even wider variance in the price premia on organic across fascia
32- ranging from zero to 46%. In contrast, the organic share of the fruit category displays less
variation, ranging from less than 1% to over 7%. The projected maximum revenue gain from
converting all fruit to organic ranges from zero to over 60% increase.
When considering product line changes, a supermarket could compare these maximum
revenue projections to expected costs and begin to make ￿rst-order judgements as to which
changes might be pro￿table. These could be used to rule out unpro￿table changes and allow
the supermarkets to focus more detailed analysis on categories that are potentially pro￿table.
While these estimates to not provide point estimates on revenues or pro￿ts, they require very
few assumptions about consumer preferences or behaviour and so are quite robust. Further
work and either more data or more assumptions would then be needed to estimate more
precise consumer substitution responses and to gauge rivals responses.
5 Summary and conclusions
Rich data on consumer spending behaviour are now widely available in a number of countries.
These data o⁄er great potential to learn about consumers￿willingness to pay for many
di⁄erent characteristics. In this paper we have used rich data on households￿purchases of
food in the UK to estimate lower and upper bounds on willingness to pay for baskets of
organic foods as an example. We have made very few assumptions in doing this. Our results
suggest that there is enormous heterogeneity in willingness to pay for organic products and
that in aggregate willingness to pay for organic foods in England in 2004 was at least £114m
and that willingness to pay for a change to a 100% organic economy was less than £10.9bn.
It is interesting to compare our results to Blow, Browning, and Crawford (2008). In
Denmark, the organic share of the milk market is much higher than in Britain (25.3% vs.
2.1%) while the price premium is comparable (20.4% on average in Denmark not controlling
for other characteristics vs. 16.1% in Britain. Their approach illustrates how additional
assumptions (separability, no time varying demand shocks) and panel data can be used
to obtain point estimates of willingness to pay, at least for a fraction of the population.
33The willingness to pay estimates they obtain have a median of about 18.2% of the average
milk price. These estimates, while similar in magnitude to our estimates, are di¢ cult to
directly compare because they are reported only for a fraction of the population and rely
on aggregation of purchases to the monthly level. It would be useful in future work to
investigate the panel dimension of our data and obtain more precise estimates of structural
demand parameters. This will require at the very least an explicit model of store choice and
of the dynamics of household preference shocks. It will also require further assumptions to
make the problem empirically tractible.
We have also shown that the reasons that households are willing to pay for organic di⁄er,
with quality being the most important, health concerns coming second, and environmental
concerns lagging far behind. We have also shown how to usefully calculate an upper bound
on the revenue implications of introducing a new product range. These are both applications
that have direct practical relevance.
A Data appendix
The data come from the TNS Homescan panel (www.tnsofres.com). We use data for the
period 8 November 2003 to 7 November 2004. We observe expenditure for 17,162 households
[give distribution of period of time each HH in sample] and more than sixteen million pur-
chases. Households are able to leave the survey voluntarily at any time and are refreshed to
keep the sample representative of the British population. Households are issued with elec-
tronic hand held scanner in their homes. They scan the barcodes of all grocery purchases
(foodstu⁄s, alcohol, bathroom products, medicines, pet food etc.) that come into the house.
Information on purchases is downloaded once a week by TNS. Prices are collected from till
receipts, which households are required to send to TNS. In addition, information on loose
weight items such as vegetables and fruit is collected by households scanning barcodes in a
book and keying in the weight data. Purchases from all store types ￿ supermarkets, corner
stores, online, local speciality shops etc. ￿ are in principle covered by the survey. For larger
34stores, the exact store of purchase is recorded; for smaller stores the store type is known.
The data includes information on the characteristics of the product ￿ price, brand, pack size,
whether the item was bought on promotion and crucially for this work information on a large
number of characteristics of the product. Demographic information about the household is
collected by means of an annually-updated telephone survey. Participants are rewarded
with points redeemable for a range of products and services (though limited to items which
shouldn￿ t directly a⁄ect grocery consumption patterns).
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Alcohol 3987  2204941  0.5%  355197 
      
Chilled  Foods  3641 2047994  0.4% 1247368 
Chilled Dips   58  33072  0.9%  31824 
Chilled/Prepared Frt and Veg  327  179748  1.4%  150530 
Cooked  Meats    1203 688607  0.2% 492143 
Defined Chilled Meat and Veg 
Prods  793 438503  0.7% 222179 
Fresh P/P Meat and Veg Pastry 
Prds  499 285258  0.0% 191331 
Fresh  Pasta  64 34083  0.4% 22538 
Fresh Processed Poultry  697  388724  0.1%  136823 
      
Fish 455  243649  0.1%  89991 
      
Fruit  and  Vegetables  4871 2692585  2.7% 3015369 
Fruit  2206 1211694  2.3% 1078484 
Vegetable  2665 1480892  3.0% 1936885 
      
Meat 2629  1507259  0.9%  585853 
Bacon  Rashers  586 335438  0.4% 152158 
Fresh  Beef/Veal  985 560710  1.0% 182469 
Fresh Lamb  268  151177  1.8%  35215 
Fresh Pork  428  247365  0.7%  82655 
Fresh  Sausages  294 169143  0.6% 107576 
Frozen  Sausages  68 43427  0.4% 25780 
      
Bakery  Products  2533 1448038  0.7% 1601182 
Christmas Puddings  25  14733  1.2%  5480 
Bread  890 505176  1.8% 647145 
Cakes and Pastries   899  518417  0.0%  452598 
Morning  Goods    719 409712  0.1% 495959 
      
Biscuits  1345 784361  1.4% 843088 
      
Canned  Goods  828 484427  0.9% 805739 
Baked  Beans  170 101200  0.7% 157628 
Canned  Fruit  113 63600  0.9% 94628 
Canned  Milk  Puddings  24 14036  1.0% 23231 
Canned  Pasta  88 55129  0.0% 92251 
Other Canned Veg   39  22343  0.3%  49883 
Prepared Peas And Beans  66  37834  1.9%  107133 
Soups In Tins and Cartons  214  122862  1.2%  161741 
Sweetcorn  (Canned)  32 19536  0.2% 32379 
Tinned Tomatoes, Passata  82  47889  1.7%  86865 
      
Confectionery  1469 843773  2.0% 650719 
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Table  1  continued      
      
Dairy  Products  5294 3010922  2.2% 2445957 
Butter  247 136996  1.6% 108535 
Chilled Desserts (excl Formage 
Frais)  328 189676  0.5% 184359 
Hens  Eggs  361 202374  5.7% 192100 
Margarine  364 208415  0.3% 184672 
Desserts, Long Life   26  15484  2.2%  18517 
Total Cheese (excl Formage Frais)  1387  792086  1.0%  504362 
Cream, inc. Flavoured  141  78399  1.3%  98333 
Total  Milk  1623 930530  2.1% 730080 
Yoghurt  647 362812  5.6% 380404 
Yoghurt Drinks and Juices, wet  139  76948  1.6%  37110 
Yoghurt Drinks and Juices, dry  31  17204  0.8%  7485 
      
Frozen Foods  2579  1529941  0.5%  946448 
Defined Processed Poultry Prods  198  124053  0.2%  60278 
Frozen Confectionery  191  112158  0.1%  69393 
Frozen Meat Products  740  437358  0.4%  245778 
Frozen Pizzas  288  173711 0.1%  93273 
Frozen  Vegetables  436 263116  1.2% 216498 
Other Frozen Foods excl. Pizza  256  150879  0.5%  100995 
Ice  Cream  470 268667  0.8% 160233 
      
Hot  Beverages  952 536615  2.2% 267346 
Food  Drinks  102 56811  1.4% 42024 
Fruit And Herbal Teas  26  14301  3.8%  13197 
Instant Coffee  423  238267  1.4%  92384 
Coffee  Beans  71 36566 13.0% 15868 
Tea  330 190671  1.4% 103873 
      
Breakfast  Foods  1277 738977  1.6% 534046 
Breakfast  Cereals  949 552569  1.4% 339142 
Chocolate  Spread  11 7098 1.4% 7506 
Honey  40 22177  4.1% 11585 
Pastes and Spreads   145  83376  0.9%  92353 
Peanut  Butter  21 12616  1.4% 11855 
Preserves  111 61141  3.0% 71605 
      
Pickles and Sauces  965  551509  1.3%  541825 
Mustard 15  8696  0.5%  11592 
Olives 20  11000  0.6%  8850 
Pickles  48 27424  0.6% 31151 
Salad  Accompaniments,  wet  85 49771  0.4% 43521 
Salad  Accompaniments,  dry  47 26444  1.8% 27749 
Sauces and Ketchup (excl 
Worcester)  119 70963  1.5% 71261 
Sauces For Cooking and 
Condiment,  wet  546 308462  1.5% 294987 
Sauces For Cooking and 
Condiment, dry  17 9706 2.3%  10564 
Sour and Speciality Pickles   68  39044  0.3%  42150 
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Table  1  continued      
      
Take  Home  Savouries  948 561387  1.0% 474400 
Crisps  429 254599  0.2% 212194 
Nuts  136 74801  1.2% 58590 
Savoury Snacks and Reconstitutes  383  231987  1.9%  203616 
      
Carbohydrate and Savoury 
Snacks  369 211997  1.1% 267109 
Rice, Pasta, Cous Cous  211  122183  0.7%  134178 
Dried  Soup  65 36459  0.1% 50041 
Dry Meat Substitutes  2  1347  9.0%  1227 
Dry  Pasta  91 52007  2.6% 81663 
      
Savoury Home Cooking  600  342471  1.4%  345889 
Defined Mixes and Breadcrumbs  40  23693  0.2%  25694 
Ethnic  Ingredients    80 45040  0.1% 33484 
Flour  52 28677  4.9% 46345 
Meat  Extracts  166 96836  1.2% 96730 
Packet  Stuffing  21 12779  0.3% 19931 
Pepper Herbs and Spices   70  37986  0.6%  37987 
Salt 16  9523  0.6%  14954 
Vinegar  22 12437  3.6% 18667 
White Fats And Oils  133  75500  1.7%  52097 
      
Soft  Drinks  1655 961825  2.2% 730395 
Bottled  Non-Lemonade  244 143069  6.1% 131515 
Canned  Colas  171 97233  0.0% 34986 
Canned  Non-Lemonade  91 52923  1.0% 30739 
Fruit  Juices  590 326195  2.8% 266801 
One  Shot  Drinks  241 147864  1.5% 110848 
Fruit  Squash  318 194541  0.4% 155506 
      
Sweet  Home  Cooking  450 253372  1.1% 269682 
Home  Baking    163 88155  2.1% 74980 
Lemon And Lime Juices  7  4336  1.2%  7045 
Mincemeat  (Sweet)  6 3631 0.4% 2981 
Powdered Desserts and Custard  82  47803  0.2%  63729 
Sugar  183 104139  0.5% 114878 
Syrup and Treacle  9  5308  3.1%  6069 
      
Total 36847  20,956,043  1.4%  16017603 
 
Note: Data include 17,162 households over the period 8 November 2003 to 7 November 2004. A 
purchase is a household-store-day transaction (if a household buys two of the exact same product in 
one day at the same store this is one transaction, if they buy the same product at a different store or a 
different product at the same store that counts as a separate transaction). 
Table B.1 shows the breakdown by category.   42
Table 2: Hedonic regressions for bacon rashers 
Dep var: ln(price per kg)  (1)  (2) 
Organic 0.0847  0.483 
 [0.114]  [0.076] 
size quintile 2    -0.177 
   [0.033] 
size quintile 3    -0.194 
   [0.035] 
size quintile 4    -0.233 
   [0.048] 
size quintile 5    -0.393 
   [0.036] 
Budget Private Label    -0.431 
   [0.054] 
Standard Private Label    0.094 
   [0.031] 
Streaky   -0.298 
   [0.037] 
origin Ireland    0.151 
   [0.104] 
origin Danish    -0.061 
   [0.033] 
origin Dutch    -0.168 
   [0.031] 
origin Other foreign    -0.152 
   [0.042] 
packaging: Prepacked    0.056 
   [0.039] 
Ticket price reduction    -0.163 
   [0.022] 
Multi-purchase deal    -0.263 
   [0.034] 
Extra free deal    -0.031 
   [0.056] 
Asda   1.989 
   [0.047] 
Large Discount Store    1.977 
   [0.063] 
MandS   2.577 
   [0.059] 
Waitrose   2.415 
   [0.051] 
Other Chain Store    2.165 
   [0.050] 
Safeway   2.027 
   [0.043] 
Sainsbury   2.246 
   [0.061] 
Tesco   2.084 
   [0.042] 
Small store    2.019 
   [0.043] 
Time and region effects  no  yes 
R-squared 0.01  0.98 
Note: Regression include 152,158 observations. Standard errors in [] are clustered at the barcode level and 
allow for general correlation..    43
Table 3: Organic coefficient, R
2 and characteristics for all food categories 





R2  characteristics 
      brand  size  fat  flavour  origin  package  variety  obs 
 1 Alcohol                     
Alcohol 0.138  0.048  0.95  3  5          43  355197 
 2 Chilled Foods                     
Chilled Dips   0.356  0.047  0.98  3  5    89    3    31824 
Chilled/Prepared Frt and Veg  0.352  0.098  0.95  3  5        2  8  150530 
Cooked  Meats    0.580  0.092  0.97  3  5      2  15  492143 
Defined Chilled Meat and Veg 
Prods  0.220  0.084  0.93  3  5      5   222179 
Fresh Meat and Veg Pastry Prds  0.341  0.064  0.95  3  5            191331 
Fresh Pasta  0.088  0.071  0.99  3  5          29  22538 
Fresh Processed Poultry  0.396  0.086  0.97  3  5    4    2    136823 
 3 Fish                     
Wet/smoked  fish  0.097  0.057  0.98  3  5      2  40  89991 
 4 Fruit and Vegetables                     
Fruit    0.230  0.043  0.91 3 5     25  2  95  1078484 
Vegetable    0.404  0.025  0.83 4 5     16  2  135  1936885 
 5 Meat                     
Bacon Rashers  0.483  0.076  0.98  3  5      6  2  4  152158 
Fresh Beef/Veal  0.247  0.123  0.91  3  5      5  2  5  182469 
Fresh Lamb  0.142  0.084  0.97  3  5      4  2  2  35215 
Fresh Pork  0.376  0.073  0.96  3  5      3  2  2  82655 
Fresh  Sausages  0.541  0.063 0.95 3  5   132   2 14  107576 
Frozen  Sausages  0.715  0.082  0.88 3 5   23    11  25780 
 8 Bakery Products                     
Christmas  Puddings  0.492  0.201  0.97  3  5      3  5  5480 
Bread  0.193  0.019  0.76  4  5      4  22  647145 
Cakes and Pastries   0.537  0.067  0.91  3  5        2  84  452598 
Morning  Goods    0.098  0.049  0.90  4  5      2  34  495959 
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Table 3 continued                     
 9 Biscuits                     
Biscuits   0.047  0.058  0.92  3  5          10  843088 
10 Canned Goods                     
Baked Beans  0.415  0.095  0.96  3  5  2        37  157628 
Canned Fruit  0.505  0.151  0.67  3  5          13  94628 
Canned Milk Puddings  0.201  0.073  0.82  3  5          2  23231 
Canned  Pasta  0.622  0.105  0.71 3 5   40     8 92251 
Other Canned Veg   0.283  0.172  0.90  3  5          30  49883 
Prepared Peas And Beans  0.509  0.072  0.88  3  5          12  107133 
Soups  In  Tins  and  Cartons  0.280  0.064 0.85 3  5   325   10 2  161741 
Sweetcorn (Canned)  0.165  0.084  0.87  3  5          2  32379 
Tinned Tomatoes, Passata  0.332  0.095  0.82  3  5          5  86865 
11 Confectionery                     
Chocolate and sugar  0.221  0.061  0.96  3  5          31  650719 
12 Dairy Products                     
Butter  0.197  0.058  0.99  3  5    9     108535 
Chilled Desserts   0.413  0.165  0.94  3  5    187      19  184359 
Hens Eggs  0.418  0.028  0.98  4  5          4  192100 
Margarine 0.316  0.114  0.70  3  5          6  184672 
Desserts, Long Life   -0.022  0.019  0.93  2  5          5  18517 
Total Cheese (excl Formage Frais)  0.240  0.033  0.98  3  5  4  154  12  2  39  504362 
Cream, inc. Flavoured  -0.088  0.094  0.97  3  5  2  28    5  14  98333 
Total  Milk  0.161  0.021  0.98  3  5      4  12  730080 
Yoghurt 0.167  0.036  0.91  3  5  4  259      4  380404 
Yoghurt Drinks and Juices, wet  0.480  0.040  0.99  2  5    20        37110 
Yoghurt Drinks and Juices, dry  -0.095  0.157  0.94  3  5    55        7485 
13 Frozen Foods                     
Defined Processed Poultry Prods  0.232  0.107  0.96  3  5    4      4  60278 
Frozen Confectionery  0.087  0.107  0.95  3  5  2        13  69393 
Frozen Meat Products  0.066  0.049  0.95  3  5          10  245778 
Frozen Pizzas  0.044 0.095  0.97  3  5    139     12 93273 
Frozen Vegetables  0.127  0.094  0.76  3  5          18  216498 
Other Frozen Foods excl. Pizza  0.375  0.183  0.96  3  5          10  100995 
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Table 3 continued                     
Ice Cream  -0.100  0.235  0.91  3  5          15  160233 
14 Hot Beverages                     
Food Drinks  0.630  0.063  0.98  3  5        12  2  42024 
Fruit And Herbal Teas  0.245  0.078  1.00  3  5    145      2  13197 
Instant Coffee  0.302  0.094  0.99  3  5          10  92384 
Coffee  Beans  0.028  0.098  0.98  3  5      4  97  15868 
Tea 0.281  0.078  0.99  3  5          98  103873 
16 Breakfast Foods                     
Breakfast  Cereals  0.225  0.056 0.97 3  5   177     3  339142 
Chocolate  Spread  0.392  0.109  0.97 3 5   19   3    7506 
Honey 0.243  0.040  0.99  3  5          38  11585 
Pastes and Spreads   0.165  0.055  0.98  3  5    318    3  8  92353 
Peanut Butter  0.575  0.054  0.97  3  5          9  11855 
Preserves  0.228  0.082 0.85 3  5   121     14 71605 
18 Pickles and Sauces                     
Mustard  0.411  0.088  0.98 3 5   18   5  15  11592 
Olives  0.088  0.096  0.95  3  5      7  7  8850 
Pickles 0.450  0.108  0.96  3  5          141  31151 
Salad  Accompaniments,  wet  0.734  0.068  0.97 3 5 2  68   4  70  43521 
Salad  Accompaniments,  dry  0.443 0.310 0.90  3  5  2 140    7 142 27749 
Sauces and Ketchup (excl 
Worcester) 0.166  0.081  0.91  3  5          3  71261 
Sauces For Cooking and 
Condiment, wet  0.644 0.151  0.99  3  5        13 13 294987 
Sauces For Cooking and 
Condiment,  dry  0.114  0.065  0.96  2  5      4  94  10564 
Sour and Speciality Pickles   0.491  0.191  0.90  3  5        6  37  42150 
19 Take Home Savouries                     
Crisps  0.195  0.098 0.99 3  5   212     13  212194 
Nuts 0.324  0.113  0.88  3  5        13    58590 
Savoury Snacks and Reconstitutes  0.227  0.109  0.98  3  5    183        203616 
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Table  3  continued                     
20 Carbohydrate and Savoury 
Snacks                
Rice, Pasta, Cous Cous  0.040  0.080  0.94  3  5          235  134178 
Dried Soup  0.599  0.194  0.99  3  5  2  144    5  2  50041 
Dry Meat Substitutes  0.266  0.082  0.99  2  5          19  1227 
Dry Pasta  0.354  0.105  0.81  3  5          83  81663 
21 Savoury Home Cooking                     
Defined Mixes and Breadcrumbs  0.939  0.212  0.96  3  5    74    9  129  25694 
Ethnic  Ingredients    0.183  0.080  0.95  3  5        33484 
Flour 0.100  0.096  0.97  3  5          25  46345 
Meat  Extracts  0.206  0.158  0.97  3  5        96730 
Packet  Stuffing  0.618  0.026  0.99 3 5   35    35  19931 
Pepper Herbs and Spices   0.123  0.071  0.97  3  5            37987 
Salt  0.766  0.439  0.88  3  5      9  6  14954 
Vinegar  0.073  0.179  0.87 3 5   21   2  27  18667 
White Fats And Oils  0.434  0.119  0.86  3  5          3  52097 
22 Soft Drinks                     
Bottled Non-Lemonade  0.737  0.169  0.93  3  5  2  172        131515 
Canned Colas  0.155  0.094  0.68  3  5  2  5        34986 
Canned  Non-Lemonade  0.119  0.156  0.78 3 5 2  81       30739 
Fruit Juices  0.332  0.051  0.88  3  5  2  167    2  7  266801 
One  Shot  Drinks  0.389  0.045  0.68 3 5 2  233   10  2  110848 
Fruit Squash  0.820  0.180  0.82  3  5  5  110      4  155506 
23 Sweet Home Cooking                     
Home  Baking    0.162  0.060  0.93  3  5        74980 
Lemon And Lime Juices  0.476  0.059  0.97  2  5          2  7045 
Mincemeat (Sweet)  0.397  0.117  0.87  3  5          2  2981 
Powdered Desserts and Custard  0.837  0.172  0.94  3  5          14  63729 
Sugar 0.327  0.155  0.90  3  5          10  114878 
Syrup and Treacle  1.445  0.108  0.88  2  5          2  6069 
Notes: Each row represents a separate hedonic  regression. An observation is a transaction. The coefficient and standard error are those on a dummy for whether the specific 
product (bar code) is organic. Standard errors are clustered at the product level. The adjusted R
2 is from the overall regression. The numbers indicate the number of characteristics 
of each type appear in the hedonic regression. For example, for Bacon Rashers there are 3 brand characteristics (Branded, Budget or Standard Private Label), 4 origin 
characteristics (Britain, Ireland, Northern Europe and Other) and 2 variety characteristics (smoked or unsmoked). In all regressions there are 5 size categories, 8 store indicators 
(see Table 2), time and region effects. The final column shows the number of  observations.    47
Table 4: share of household expenditure on foods with organic characteristic 
share of household expenditure on 
foods with organic characteristic 
Number of 
households 
% of sample  Cumulative % of 
sample 
zero  3,132 18.25 18.25 
less than 0.25%  3,407  19.85  38.10 
btwn  0.25%-0.5%  2,949 17.18 55.28 
btwn  0.5%-1%  3,198 18.63 73.92 
btwn  1%-5%  3,739 21.79 95.71 
btwn 5%-10%  451  2.63  98.33 
over 10%  286  1.67  100.00 
Total 17,162  100.00   
 
Table 5: estimated household lower bound on willingness to pay for organic over a year 




% of sample  Cumulative % of 
sample 
zero  3,225 18.79 18.79 
less than £1  5,122  29.85  48.64 
btwn  £1-£5  5,915 34.47 83.10 
btwn £5-£10  1,457  8.49  91.59 
btwn £10-£50  1,216  7.09  98.68 
btwn £50-£100  129  0.75  99.43 
over £100   98  0.57  100.00 
Total 17,162  100.00   
 
Table 6: estimated household lower bound on willingness to pay for organic over a year 
as a share of expenditure on organic products 
lower bound on willingness to pay for 
organic as a share of household 
expenditure on organic foods  
Number of 
households 
% of sample  Cumulative % of 
sample 
zero  3,225 18.79 18.79 
less than 10%  1,353  7.88  26.68 
btwn 10-15%  1,707  9.95  36.62 
btwn  15-20%  3,856 22.47 59.09 
btwn  20-25%  3,396 19.79 78.88 
btwn  25-50%  3,405 19.84 98.72 
over 50%  220  1.28  100.00 
Total 17,162  100.00   
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Table 7: bundling of organic products 
  with  fascia   whole  market  
Number of characteristics that differ to 




% of products  Number of 
organic 
products 
% of products 
0  5908 80.68  2957 87.41 
1  1370 18.71  412 12.18 
2  44 0.60  14 0.41 
3 1  0.01     
Total 7323  100.00  3383  100 
 
Table 8: bundling of non-organic products 
  with  fascia   whole  market  
Number of characteristics 





% of products  Number of non-
organic products 
% of products 
0  61318 28.67  35806 40.98 
1  84984 39.73  34165 39.10 
2  32731 15.30  9832 11.25 
3  17834 8.34  5135 5.88 
4  8322 3.89  1993 2.28 
5  8076 3.78  437 0.50 
6  619 0.29  2 0.00 
7  1  0.00   
Total  213885 100.00  87370 100.00   49
Table 9: Health, share of expenditure on organic, lower bound on wtp as share of total expenditure and number of households 
    Organic Products Are Healthier 









    
I Try To Buy a Healthy Range Of 
Foods These Days 








Note: In each cell the % indicates that share of total household expenditure that is on organic products, and the number in () indicates the 
number of households that selected the indicated response. 
 
Table 10: Environment, share of expenditure on organic, lower bound on wtp as share of total expenditure and number of households 
    Organic Products Are Friendlier To The Environment 









    
I Try To Buy Environmentally 
Friendly Products 








Note: In each cell the % indicates that share of total household expenditure that is on organic products, and the number in () indicates the 
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Table 11: Quality, share of expenditure on organic and number of households 
`    Organic Foods Are Better Quality 









     I Don't Mind Paying For Quality 








Note: In each cell the % indicates that share of total household expenditure that is on organic products, and the number in () indicates the 
number of households that selected the indicated response.   51
 
Table 12: Determinants of lower and upper bound on willingness to pay for organic 
Dep var: lower bound on willingness to pay for 
organic  in  £  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All  households  All  households  All  households  Class AB  Class C  Class DE 
Health  important  6.008 5.528 4.883 7.445 4.637 4.255 
 [0.544]  [0.561]  [0.520]  [1.977] [0.663] [0.863] 
Health (upper right quadrant  of Table 8)    -0.987 -1.293 -5.959 -1.327 -0.026 
   [0.613]  [0.628]  [3.392] [0.879] [0.675] 
Health (bottom left quadrant of Table 8)    -0.706 -1.238 -3.034 -1.453 -0.216 
   [0.156]  [0.201]  [1.332] [0.231] [0.183] 
Environment  important  1.606 2.089 1.539 2.052 1.428 1.678 
 [0.694]  [0.605]  [0.555]  [2.452] [0.688] [0.815] 
Environment (upper right quadrant  of Table 9)    0.668  0.287  3.749  0.164  -0.337 
   [0.490]  [0.515]  [2.475] [0.664] [0.528] 
Environment (bottom left quadrant of Table 9)    -0.132  -0.51  -2.089  -0.312  -0.395 
   [0.171]  [0.188]  [1.097] [0.241] [0.233] 
Quality  important  9.831 9.566 8.983 9.749  10.249  5.374 
 [1.216]  [1.249]  [1.178]  [4.165] [1.533] [1.469] 
Quality  (upper right quadrant  of Table 10)    -0.619  -0.38  3.061  -0.699  0.202 
   [0.834]  [0.796]  [4.587] [0.812] [1.437] 
Quality (bottom left quadrant of Table 10)    -0.281 -0.997 -3.007 -0.743 -0.811 
   [0.179]  [0.225]  [1.383] [0.232] [0.341] 
Single  young      3.202 6.344 3.162 2.318 
      [0.780] [5.863] [0.949] [0.636] 
Single  with  kids      1.836 9.757 1.151 1.537 
      [0.586] [6.599] [0.718] [0.528] 
Single  pensioner      2.918 5.566 1.988 2.526 
      [0.736] [6.207] [0.982] [0.560] 
Couple  no  kids      2.442 2.785 2.646 1.742 
      [0.564] [3.574] [0.723] [0.741] 
Couple with kids      0.866  -0.576  1.203  0.195   52
      [0.460] [2.816] [0.659] [0.420] 
Couple  pensioner      1.621 0.652 2.332 1.228 
      [0.518] [3.187] [0.928] [0.425] 
Other  no  kids      1.574 0.003 1.148 2.515 
      [0.584] [3.438] [0.714] [0.887] 
At least one vegetarian in the household      4.993  6.815  6.335  0.783 
      [1.740] [5.826] [2.382] [1.116] 
Annual expenditure on alcohol, food, toiletries and 
cleaning  products      0.003 0.008 0.003 0.002 
      [0.001] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] 
Household Class A or B      3.255       
     [0.822]     
Household class C1 or C2      0.474       
     [0.266]     
Response to attitudinal question missing  -1.155 -1.111 -0.967 -3.585 -1.039 -0.642 
 [0.284]  [0.286]  [0.309]  [1.705] [0.460] [0.412] 
Constant  2.623  2.943  -5.326 -12.056 -4.217  -3.013 
 [0.116]  [0.157]  [1.253]  [9.883] [1.218] [0.686] 
        
Observations  14383 14383 14383  1430  8309  4644 
R-squared  0.06 0.06 0.09  0.1  0.09 0.12 
Notes: Standard errors in [] are robust. See Table 12 for means of variables.   53
 
Table 13: mean of demographic variables 
Variable mean  (s.d.) 
Family type = Single young  0.082 
  (0.275) 
Family type =Single parent   0.065 
  (0.247) 
Family type = Single pensioner  0.075 
  (0.264) 
Family type = Couple no children  0.136 
  (0.343) 
Family type = Couple with children  0.395 
  (0.489) 
Family type = Pensioner couple  0.115 
  (0.319) 
Family type = Others no children  0.083 
  (0.276) 
Family type = Others with children  0.0483 
  (0.137) 
Annual expenditure on alcohol, food, toiletries and 
cleaning products 
2002.95 
  (1052.78) 
Household Class A or B  0.099 
  (0.299) 
Household class C1 or C2  0.578 
  (0.494) 
At least one vegetarian in the household  0.0220 
  (0.147) 
Demographics or attitudes missing  0.035 
  (0.183) 
Notes: Social class is A (upper middle class - higher managerial, administrative or professional), B 
(middle class - intermediate managerial, administrative or professional) C1 (lower middle class - 
supervisory or clerical, junior managerial, administrative or professional) or C2 (skilled working class 
- skilled manual workers) (the omitted category is D (working class - semi and unskilled manual 
workers) and E (those at lowest level of subsistence - state pensioners or widows (no other earner), 
casual or lowest grade workers). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of estimated price premia with and without controls for 
other observed characteristics 
 
 
Figure 2: density of lower bound on households' willingness to pay for organic food 
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Figure 3: density of upper bound on households' willingness to pay for organic food 
 
 
 